**Modern Slavery Unit**

***Nigeria Anti-Human Trafficking Programme***

Theory of Change & Results Framework

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# **Executive Summary**

**Introduction**

The Modern Slavery Unit, managed by the United Kingdom’s Home Office, seeks to reduce the prevalence of modern slavery in and from Nigeria. Since Nigeria is a key source country for human trafficking flows into the UK, in September 2016 the Prime Minister announced that the UK will spend at least £5m in Nigeria to address this problem. As a result, the Modern Slavery Unit (MSU) will implement a £5m programme of activities in Nigeria over four years (2018-2021) to reduce human trafficking from Nigeria.

The Stabilisation Unit has supported the development and articulation of a theory of change for the programme and the design a results framework to monitor progress on the programme’s implementation, for which this report is the result. A further recommendation is that a conflict analysis and resultant conflict sensitivity review, along with a gender sensitivity review, be undertaken early in the programme’s implementation to ensure that any mitigating actions are adopted at the programme’s outset.

This theory of change has been developed on the premise that by understanding the contextual factors that *enable* and other factors that *drive* human trafficking in Nigeria, we can aim to address those drivers and therefore *contribute* to reducing the prevalence of human trafficking in Nigeria.

**Theory of Change**

A key driver of human trafficking may be broadly identified as *poverty*. This relates to conditions of economic hardship and a lack of opportunity that may result in a sense of despair that specific conditions may change without significant alteration to one’s environment. As one author notes, ‘the feeling of hopelessness in Nigeria and the view of emigration as the road to riches make many Nigerians willing to take considerable risks to gain a foothold in a rich country’. One report also identifies human trafficking itself as a driver, where victims of trafficking (VoTs) are highly vulnerable to being *re-trafficked*.

A further driver of human trafficking in Nigeria may be called *social* *complicity*. This complex factor emerges as a function of the endemic poverty and hopelessness described above and serves as an enabler of human trafficking. Evidence suggests that the ‘get rich quick’ narrative and the community-engrained attitudes that tolerate violence against women and girls and domestic servitude overseas supports and, in fact, promotes the existence of trafficking.

The fourth driver that this paper notes in perpetuating human trafficking in Nigeria is the *impunity* that traffickers enjoy in their undertaking. Impunity emerges from a lack of deterrence where traffickers exploit an imbalance in the cost / benefit of trafficking. Without any considerable or likely punitive consequence to trafficking, there is little that deters them from exploiting the lucrative benefits that they reap from trafficking vulnerable women and girls.

In response to these identified drivers and enablers of human trafficking in Nigeria, the Modern Slavery Unit’s programming has been designed to reduce these factors. The programme’s **inputs** have therefore been formulated around the four project areas outlined below.

1. The victim support component of the programme will target victims of trafficking in Nigeria through a tailored support package that will complement and strengthen Nigeria’s National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) systems and the National Referral Mechanism. The support is to focus on the following areas: i) the delivery of a tailored support package to support the return and reintegration of VoTs; ii) support to set up income-generating activities; and iii) witness support to provide intelligence and participate in trials towards enhancing investigations and prosecutions of traffickers.
2. The law enforcement capacity-building component aims to strengthen the capacity of NAPTIP and the Nigerian Criminal Justice System to prosecute trafficking cases. The support will focus on the following areas: i) increasing the number and quality of trafficking prosecutions undertaken by NAPTIP Zonal commend through enhanced training and the provision of investigative equipment; ii) ensuring that investigations and prosecutions are conducted in a legally compliant manner, conforming to national and international standards.
3. The judicial capacity-buildingcomponent would aim to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the court systems to prosecute trafficking cases and increase the rate of prosecution. The component would target 6-9 judges spread between Lagos, Benin City and Abuja for training to improve the prosecution rate for modern slavery cases. The support is to focus on training in the following areas: i) improved case and trial management; ii) managing modern slavery cases specifically (sensitivity to victims, special measures in legislation, equipment for remote victim engagement); and iii) dissemination activities to raise awareness amongst the wider judiciary and legal community in Nigeria.
4. The strategic communications component aims to enhance NAPTIP’s communication capabilities by working through their Public Enlightenment Department and the Press Unit to improve their public communication capacity and facilitate innovative awareness raising approaches. The support is likely to focus on i) supporting improved public communications tools, and ii) supporting innovative awareness-raising approaches.

Based on these programmatic inputs, the following **outputs** are noted to initiate the results portion of the programme’s theory of change:

1. Return and reintegration support provided to victims of trafficking
2. Law enforcement capabilities strengthened to investigate trafficking suspects
3. Judicial capabilities strengthened to prosecute trafficking suspects
4. Strategic communication tools and mechanisms supported

From these outputs, an **intermediate outcome** level is suggested for areas of support that are more indirect and less likely to directly aid beneficiaries. This level can be characterised as the programme’s main counterpart or stakeholder adopting or taking up key aspects of programme support towards their own implementation of that support, which then leads to the programme’s desired outcomes and impact.

The following **outcomes** are suggested as resulting from the programme’s outputs and their adoption:

1. Victims of trafficking reintegrated into Nigerian society
2. Enhanced state capacity to investigate and prosecute trafficking suspects
3. Enhanced public awareness of human trafficking reduces complicity
4. Increased deterrence from trafficking in persons

Ultimately, the programme’s intended objective is articulated in its **impact**, suggested as the following: that *the prevalence of human trafficking from Nigeria is reduced*.

A set of indicative indicators has also been developed to constitute a results framework for the programme. These provide initial frameworks for measuring progress against key areas of the theory of change, but these may be further tailored once programme specifics are more clearly defined as implementation gets further underway.

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# **List of Acronyms**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| DCE | Deployable Civilian Expert |
| DFID | Department for International Development |
| HMG | Her Majesty’s Government |
| HO | Home Office |
| IOM | International Organisation for Migration |
| JBTF | Joint Border Task Force |
| M&E | Monitoring & Evaluation |
| MSU | Modern Slavery Unit |
| NAPTIP | National Agency for the Prevention of Trafficking in Persons |
| NGO | Non-government organisational |
| PVOT | Potential Victim of Trafficking |
| SU | Stabilisation Unit |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UNODC | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime |
| VoT | Victim of Trafficking |

# **Introduction**

## Provenance

The Modern Slavery Unit, managed by the United Kingdom’s Home Office, seeks to reduce the prevalence of modern slavery in and from Nigeria. Since Nigeria is a key source country for human trafficking flows into the UK, in September 2016 the Prime Minister announced that the UK will spend at least £5m in Nigeria to address this problem. As a result, the Modern Slavery Unit (MSU) will implement a £5m programme of activities in Nigeria over four years (2018-2021) to reduce human trafficking from Nigeria.

The Stabilisation Unit (SU) has provided support to the programme through a scoping missing to Nigeria in early 2017, which produced a scoping report that outlined a set of recommended interventions and implementation modalities. The intervention recommendations include victim support, law enforcement advice, judicial training, and strategic communications support.[[1]](#footnote-1)

One specific recommendation was the provision of technical support to articulate a theory of change for the programme and to design a results framework to monitor progress on the programme’s implementation. The SU supported the implementation of this recommendation by contracting a deployable civilian expert (DCE) from its roster to undertake this task, of which this report is a key output.

In addition to the articulation of the programme’s theory of change and the development of its results framework, this task includes the development of terms of reference for ‘contracting an independent monitoring system’ for the duration of the programme’s implementation.[[2]](#footnote-2)

## Methods

The task was undertaken through a mixed-methods approach, which combines desk-based document reviews with field-based key informant and stakeholder interviews. The desk-based document review assessed programme design documentation, primarily the various terms of references developed to undertake each programme component, as well as other supporting or background documentation, such as the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner’s Recommendations on strategic programming to combat modern slaver in Edo State, Nigeria, and the SU’s report mentioned above: ‘Programme Scoping Report – recommended approach and options for delivery on a multi-year programme’.

The field-based discussions occurred during a joint mission to Nigeria during 12-17 November 2017. The trip was undertaken by members from the Home Office (HO), the DCE from the SU, and members from the Department for International Development (DFID) (both Nigeria- and London-based). The joint trip was largely meant to maximise the time of stakeholders asked to engage with the delegation, as both DFID and the HO viewed the stakeholder discussions as feeding into critical programme design questions that each department has for its impending programme implementation.

While the joint mission was intended to enhance the efficiency for both the UK representatives and Nigeria government counterparts, it also encouraged dialogue amongst the UK representatives towards enhancing programme complementarity, given the different remits and scope that DFID and the HO each have. A list of the HMG representatives on the trip, as well as the stakeholders met during the trip, is provided in Annex I.

## Premises

This theory of change has been developed on the premise that by understanding the contextual factors that *enable* and other factors that *drive* human trafficking in Nigeria, we can aim to address those drivers and therefore *contribute* to reducing the prevalence of human trafficking in Nigeria. With this premise in mind, there are two important considerations in keep in mind.

## *Approach*

Firstly, given the complex nature of the environment under discussion with multiple interacting elements (the ‘drivers’ and ‘factors’), conventional quantitative evaluation methodologies (experimental or counterfactual-based designs) become untenable in determining impact. Instead, theory-based approaches offer frameworks to understand how a programme or set of interventions might be contributing to a desired change.

Theory-based approaches to monitoring and evaluation place a programme’s theory of change at the centre of a design, particularly the assumptions about how change is expected to occur (i.e. how a proposed solution is expected to resolve a perceived problem) in contrast to methods-centric approaches, which require fidelity to a particular methodological application for veracity.[[3]](#footnote-3) Thus a theory-based approach centralises the programme’s theory and tests that, rather than insisting on strict adherence to an evaluation method, which tends to be unsympathetic to contextual or programmatic specificities. A theory-based approach, simply stated, holds that if particular contextual factors remain sufficiently static so as not to alter the premise of the assumptions of causality, and if the programme’s implementation is sound and effective in achieving its specific outputs as per the theory of change, and the assumptions are determined to be valid, then its contribution can be claimed.

This approach is important here as this premise underpins the way that the ToC have been developed, particularly two key aspects: identifying a set of problems that interventions aim to address, and ensuring that the assumptions – both causal and circumstantial – are clearly articulated and substantiated with evidence. This is especially important as there is a dearth of evidence for many of the assumptions that the programme’s interventions hold for how it will affect change.

The second aspect to note is the use of the word ‘contribution’, which is not simply semantical, but relates rather to the likely attributable impact able to be determined from the HO-supported programme. As with the impetus for a theory-based approach to the ToC design and monitoring framework, the programme’s support is most accurately understood in terms of its *contribution* to change, rather than specific impacts being wholly *attributable* to the MSU’s support. As noted above, given the complex nature of varying influences in any given outcome, the HO can at best hope to contribute to a change in context or circumstance, rather than purporting to singularly *cause* a specific impact.[[4]](#footnote-4)

## *Design*

The approach to the programme’s design, as articulated in this theory of change, is based on the idea that the programme will have *spheres of influence* through which its occurs. This approach is intended to provide a basis to more accurately monitor the *influencing* element of the support. This is particularly important where interventions are more technical in nature, rather than directly supporting beneficiaries. ‘As influencing interventions are often intangible and multi-dimensional, considerable attention should be given to framing and describing the relevant, discrete elements which, together, contribute to a particular influencing intervention process, i.e. a pathway to deliver particular goals. The more an influencing intervention can be broken down into discrete units of measurement mapped against the results chain, the more robust monitoring and evaluation can be.’[[5]](#footnote-5)

The approach, therefore, aims to do so largely by the explicit articulation of outputs, described as the deliverables based on *inputs* and existing entirely within a programme’s *direct control*, followed by intermediate outcomes, where a programme has *direct influence* and it is expected that the programme’s outputs are adopted or taken up by specific beneficiaries. This is followed by the sphere in which a programme has only *indirect influence*, in which its outcomes and ultimate impact area reached.[[6]](#footnote-6) This is elaborated on in its practical form in greater detail in the ToC.

## *Conflict & Gender Sensitivity*

Furthermore, at the time of this theory of change development, a conflict analysis had not yet been conducted to inform the programme’s sensitivity to conflict dynamics. A conflict analysis is needed to enhance the programme’s conflict sensitivity and to ensure that it does not contribute to exacerbating drivers of conflict in Nigeria, particularly in the specific geographical areas where the programme will focus its efforts.

It is also recommended that the programme components undergo a gender sensitivity review to ensure that their design and implementation modalities are aligned with HMG gender objectives and sensitivity to the programme’s possible impact on gender dynamics in Nigeria. This is particularly important given the sensitive nature of core elements of the programme and their relationship to possible gender dynamics. It is thus recommended that a conflict analysis and resultant conflict sensitivity review, along with a gender sensitivity review, be undertaken as soon as possible in the programme’s implementation to ensure that any mitigating actions are adopted at the programme’s outset.

# **Theory of Change**

*As much as the theory of change articulated below aims to provide an accurate reflection of the Modern Slavery Unit’s programme in Nigeria (at the time this paper was drafted), a ToC should never be seen to be static, but as dynamic and should be revisited on a regular basis as new project elements are designed and further evidence becomes available to guide the underlying assumptions.*

## Context

The Global Slavery Index reports that there are 875,500 people living in slavery in Nigeria[[7]](#footnote-7) and trafficked for domestic servitude, forced marriage, sexual exploitation, begging, underpaid and exploited forced labour in the agricultural, manufacturing and construction industries, and organ harvesting.[[8]](#footnote-8) The UK’s National Crime Agency’s National Referral Mechanism identified 243 potential Nigerian victims in 2016, making it the fourth most common country of origin of potential victims of trafficking (PVOTs) in the UK.[[9]](#footnote-9)

Human trafficking (HT) is therefore seen to be a significant humanitarian, social, and economic issue within Nigeria, while also posing a security risk to the UK for those trafficked into the UK.

Simply understanding what the context of human trafficking is, both in Nigeria and its impact on persons trafficked into the UK, does not itself suffice for contributing to addressing the problem. Rather, a deeper understanding of what *drives* human trafficking in terms of push factors and enabling factors allows for a more complete view of how to frame a programme designed to reduce the flow of trafficked persons. The following section elaborates on contextual aspects that may serve to drive or enable human trafficking from Nigeria.

## Problem

The SU Programme Scoping Report identified human trafficking itself as a first driver, where victims of trafficking (VoTs) are highly vulnerable to being *re-trafficked*. This was established through discussions that the SU had with stakeholders during their scoping missing earlier in 2017, where various stakeholders identify ‘an increasing number of cases [that] involve victims and/or the return from abroad of victims of trafficking’.[[10]](#footnote-10) This individual-level vulnerability to re-trafficking is compounded by the lack of a systematic and effective reintegration package, due largely to a lack of capacity amongst national agencies and supporting civil society organisations. Whilst data is difficult to obtain in this regard, the SU report notes that an estimated 34% of PVOTs in the UK are re-trafficked.[[11]](#footnote-11)

A key driver of human trafficking may be broadly identified as *poverty*.[[12]](#footnote-12) This relates to conditions of economic hardship and a lack of opportunity that may result in a sense of despair that specific conditions may change without significant alteration to one’s environment. The European Asylum Support Office Country of Origin Information Report for Nigeria notes the various possibilities in which women and girls are ‘promised studying opportunities, modelling careers, education and a better life, work as housekeepers or nannies and maids, trading in African products and attire, hairdressing, work in factories, farms, industries and restaurants’.[[13]](#footnote-13) Moreover, as Carling notes, ‘the feeling of hopelessness in Nigeria and the view of emigration as the road to riches make many Nigerians willing to take considerable risks to gain a foothold in a rich country’.[[14]](#footnote-14)

This is a significant factor that drives many people to migrate irregularly. This is not necessarily a drive towards human trafficking as such, but rather, in the irregular migration channels, migrants become highly vulnerable to exploitation as victims of trafficking, where traffickers will seize on an individual’s vulnerability by offering to help facilitate their migration through specific travel means, or facilitate their arrival in a destination country with promises of lucrative job opportunities. In this way, individuals driven to migrate irregularly are then lured into trafficking situations because of false promises that subsequently trap them in indentured servitude, often forced to repay high debts in exploitative labour conditions.[[15]](#footnote-15)

A further driver of human trafficking in Nigeria may be called *social* *complicity*. This complex factor emerges as a function of the endemic poverty and hopelessness described above and serves as an enabler of human trafficking. The SU report notes that ‘the “get rich quick” narrative and the community-engrained attitudes that tolerate violence against women and girls and domestic servitude overseas supports and, in fact, promotes the existence of trafficking’.[[16]](#footnote-16) This is not to state that social attitudes necessarily affirm the exploitation of women and girls, but that they might be complicit in accepting certain levels of undesirable labour circumstances if that allows women and girls opportunity to earn incomes that they would otherwise never dream possible if they were to stay in Nigeria.

Carling explains that Edo State, which has the highest rate of human trafficking in Nigeria, has a long history of successful emigration to Europe where women were able to have positive economic outcomes without succumbing to exploitation or incurring large debts.[[17]](#footnote-17) However, this trend has changed in recent years, where younger women have sought to pursue this historic ideal, doing so in ways that are increasingly dangerous due to a lack of resources for more regular means of migration. And traffickers have seized on these vulnerable women and girls. However, communities are frequently complicit in this process, often encouraging emigration and accepting that a certain level of risk or undesirable labour (even sex) may be required at times, though the full extent of the dire conditions that trafficked women are subjected to is typically not known.

Citing one specific research report, the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner’s recommendations on combating modern slavery from Edo State in Nigeria notes that only about 28% of interviewed women were recruited by strangers, while the rest (72%) were recruited by someone they knew or their family knew quite well.[[18]](#footnote-18) Importantly, while ‘some parents and families have knowledge of the likelihood of their children ending up in prostitution in Europe, they lack an understanding of the risks involved and the true nature of human trafficking’.[[19]](#footnote-19)

The fourth driver that this paper notes in perpetuating human trafficking in Nigeria is the *impunity* that traffickers enjoy in their heinous undertaking. Firstly, trafficking goes largely un- or under-reported as victims fear retribution from their traffickers and a lack of capacity from the state to protect the victim during investigations or prosecution; and consistent with Nigeria’s wider criminal justice system, ‘the rate of arrests and successful conviction of traffickers is extremely low’.[[20]](#footnote-20) Widespread corruption – widely known to characterise the Nigerian state – also contributes to trafficking impunity. Research by Human Rights Watch noted that Nigerian police ‘routinely extort money from victims to investigate a given criminal case’, leaving those who do not pay without access to justice.[[21]](#footnote-21)

One of the barriers to successfully prosecuting trafficking cases that the SU report identifies is an overall lack of capacity within the criminal justice system.[[22]](#footnote-22) Specifically notable was the fact that many judges lack the expertise to prosecute trafficking cases, often viewing VoTs as ‘prostitutes’. The courts and judges are also largely overburdened, where cases typically take 2-5 years to prosecute, deterring victims or witnesses from participating in the prolonged and onerous proceedings. A further disincentive is the challenge for victims to travel to courts where trials are undertaken, due to costs, location, or fear of reprisal from the traffickers.[[23]](#footnote-23)

In this way, impunity emerges from a lack of deterrence where traffickers exploit an imbalance in the cost / benefit of trafficking. Without any considerable or likely punitive consequence to trafficking, there is little that deters them from exploiting the lucrative benefits that they reap from trafficking vulnerable women and girls.

## Programme

In response to these identified drivers and enablers of human trafficking in Nigeria, the Modern Slavery Unit’s programming has been designed to reduce these factors. The programme’s *inputs* have therefore been formulated around the four project areas outlined below.

However, as much as four project areas are outlined below, these have been designed in the absence of any significant or robust evidence of effective counter-trafficking programmes. Aspects of the programming outlined below seek to contribute to fundamental shifts in societal perceptions and values, and inclusion in economic institutions that give rise to the poverty driver discussed above, all of which can take a generation or more to change. The programme should carefully consider itself in this wider context; and though its interventions will no doubt contribute towards aspects of change, being able to detect that change against this wider contextual fluidity and complexity will be at best challenging.

It should be noted, given the complexity of the implementation environment and the ‘problems’ that the programme aims to address, that the programme is one of ‘high risk’ in the inputs that it takes on to address the various ‘drivers’ outlined above that compel human trafficking in Nigeria. The high risk is further compounded by the immense lack of evidence for effective programming in such contexts for the interventions to draw from.[[24]](#footnote-24) Thus the impetus to address the considerable needs of human trafficking is stunted by the need to learn *how* to most effectively do so.[[25]](#footnote-25)

For these reasons the programme must prioritise learning about which aspects of its interventions are effective and which are not, and why, and redoubling those effective efforts to enhance their impact. Programme adaptation is a dynamic process in which the theory of change should be seen as an evolving articulation of causal effect that is regularly revisited in order to assess how the programme articulates these causal pathways in an emergent environment, and whether the underlying assumptions of how it does so prove valid or not.

## *Victim Support*

The victim support component of the programme will target victims of trafficking in Nigeria through a tailored support package that will complement and strengthen Nigeria’s National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) systems and the National Referral Mechanism.[[26]](#footnote-26) The activity will support civil society organisations and state authorities to design and implement at a comprehensive victim support package for VoTs. The support is to focus on the following areas: i) the delivery of a tailored support package to support the return and reintegration of VoTs; ii) support to set up income-generating activities; and iii) witness support to provide intelligence and participate in trials towards enhancing investigations and prosecutions of traffickers.[[27]](#footnote-27)

Current support packages to VoTs were generally implemented by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and NAPTIP, though both agencies appeared unable to meet the entire need for victim support.[[28]](#footnote-28) Other actors getting involved include the Edo State Human Trafficking Task Force, which has received financial support from the state governor (and thus is able to operate outside the confines of NAPTIP’s mandate and capacity);[[29]](#footnote-29) a network of civil society organisations also contributes to providing victim support.

Given the desired impact of the programme overall – *to reduce the prevalence of human trafficking from Nigeria* – the support to victims critically assumes that a comprehensive and effective reintegration package will reduce the likelihood of VoTs being *re*-trafficked, or indeed of being interested in re-attempting irregular forms of migration that may subject them to the increased likelihood of being trafficked. There is currently little evidence that is able to credibly establish this as a reasonable or valid assumption, and thus it is strongly recommended that this aspect of the programme be coupled with strong evaluative research that assesses the programme’s impact on aspects of vulnerability that drive individuals towards irregular migration. It is critical that the programme use its intervention to build evidence in this area and evaluatively trace the effect of victim support in reducing a return to irregular migration.

In addition to the challenges of the causal dimension of reducing recidivism, the support package will also target only a very small proportion of returnees – those considered potential victims of trafficking – amongst whom a smaller proportion still will chose to take up and participate in the support programme. Thus the victim support component of the programme is likely to have considerable impact on the individuals’ lives that chose to participate in the programme, but a potentially negligible impact on the programme’s ultimate objective of *reducing the prevalence of human trafficking from Nigeria* as a whole.

An additional avenue that the victim support may have to contributing to the programme’s impact is that VoTs participate as witnesses in investigations and prosecutions of trafficking cases. VoT participation may be in the form of witness testimony, the provision of intelligence to investigating authorities, and their potential recruitment of other witnesses amongst other victims. Whilst such support to trafficker prosecution will undoubtedly be a valuable contribution to reducing trafficking by reducing impunity, a number of important assumptions also render this avenue to impact similarly tenuous. Firstly, victims will need to be willing to participate in this aspect of support with any fear or anxiety of reprisal from any trafficking syndicates delicately managed, and that the evidence and testimonies victims provide will in fact be usable and able to contribute to enhancing investigations.

As with the first impact avenue – reduced recidivism – this has even less evidence and a more tenuous causal mechanism for contributing to the impact of reducing the prevalence of human trafficking. This is not to suggest that it cannot contribute in this way, but rather to state that there is simply not sufficient evidence to suggest a strong probability that it will. For this reason it is expedient to reiterate the importance for the programme to have a strong emphasis on learning about the effects of its implementation throughout its programme monitoring efforts.

## *Law Enforcement Capacity-Building*

The law enforcement capacity-building component aims to strengthen the capacity of NAPTIP and the Nigerian Criminal Justice System to prosecute trafficking cases. The capacity-building support will be tailored to cover investigation and prosecution training for NAPTIP Zonal command officers to enable NAPTIP to more effectively fulfil its mandate to investigate and prosecute traffickers.[[30]](#footnote-30) The support will focus on the following areas: i) increasing the number and quality of trafficking prosecutions undertaken by NAPTIP Zonal commend through enhanced training and the provision of investigative equipment; ii) ensuring that investigations and prosecutions are conducted in a legally compliant manner, conforming to national and international standards.[[31]](#footnote-31)

Any support provided to NAPTIP will need to ensure that individual-level capacity-building will also be able translate into increased organisational capacity, as there is a notable level of turn-over amongst NAPTIP staff.[[32]](#footnote-32) A report by the UNODC was also referenced for having identified similar findings for NAPTIP’s capacity and its ability to retain capacity enhancements as institutional knowledge.[[33]](#footnote-33)

## *Judicial Capacity-Building*

The judicial capacity-building component would aim to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the court systems to prosecute trafficking cases and increase the rate of prosecution. The component would target 6-9 judges spread between Lagos, Benin City and Abuja for training to improve the prosecution rate for modern slavery cases. [[34]](#footnote-34) The support is to focus on training in the following areas: i) improved case and trial management; ii) managing modern slavery cases specifically (sensitivity to victims, special measures in legislation, equipment for remote victim engagement); and iii) dissemination activities to raise awareness amongst the wider judiciary and legal community in Nigeria.[[35]](#footnote-35)

In order for this component of the programme to be effective, it will be imperative that all human trafficking related cases will be filtered to the judges that the programme’s support targets. According to discussions held during the team’s mission, all human trafficking related cases are indeed referred from NAPTIP – who are mandated with undertaking the investigations up to the point of a trial – to these specified judges.[[36]](#footnote-36)

Moreover, while improving the equipment available to judges to allow for remote access for victims and witnesses to testify in cases, this will require that the victims or witness are able to access similar or compatible equipment in their remote location. The equipment improvements also intend to increase the rate at which judges are able to prosecute trafficking suspects. And if judges are able to prosecute traffickers quicker, this is believed to increase the likelihood of more victim and witness participation in investigations and prosecutions, where a reduced prosecution time reduces the likelihood of witnesses or victims leaving the prosecution process. Critically, this assumes that these judges will use their increased time made available by the reduced prosecution time to prosecute other trafficking crimes, rather than simply allowing judges to continue with their general crime prosecution – that is to say, that reduced trafficking prosecution time will result in an increased numbers of trafficking prosecutions. This also assumes that victims and witnesses will be interested in engaging in prosecutions as a result of the reduced prosecution duration.

Furthermore, in order for this support to not only be effective in the near-term, for it to have sustainable impact, support will need to ensure that increased judicial capacity does not only occur for the specific judges trained by the programme, but that this is also translated into increased institutional capacity to prosecute trafficking suspects. If the increased capacity is limited to only specific judges, then the programme’s impact in this area will always be limited to those individuals, and restricted if those individuals are indisposed or leave the service of the courts.

## *Strategic Communications*

The strategic communications component aims to enhance NAPTIP’s communication capabilities by working through their Public Enlightenment Department and the Press Unit to improve their public communication capacity and facilitate innovative awareness raising approaches.[[37]](#footnote-37) The support is likely to focus on i) supporting improved public communications tools, and ii) supporting innovative awareness-raising approaches.[[38]](#footnote-38)

The strategic communications support hinges on two important areas of assumptions. The first relates to the increased organisational capacity that the support intends to provide to NAPTIP to undertake effective awareness-raising campaigns. While the embedded support will assist in various ways to provide strategic advice, develop campaigns and assist in the usage of various forms of media, the support must ensure that it translates into organisational capacity through adopted systems and mechanisms for strategic communication, rather than necessarily focus on individuals (though improved individual capacity is still important). This again relates to the challenge that NAPTIP faces with staff turnover and the likelihood that individual-focused support may well come to little effect if those individuals do not remain with NAPTIP for long periods of time.

The second important aspect is more fundamental and relates to the effect that an awareness campaign can have. Typically, awareness-raising campaigns assume that behaviour change follows increased awareness in a particular area. In the case of human trafficking in Nigeria, the campaign assumes that raising awareness amongst communities in Nigeria of the exploitative and harmful nature of human trafficking will dis-incentivise communities and families from encouraging their children to be trafficked. A related component of this is that the negative aspects of trafficking will be understood (through increased awareness) and will be considered to outweigh any potential benefit (promises of economic gain) of being trafficked. In this way the support aims to reduce complicity amongst the wider Nigerian community in allowing or even encouraging irregular migration and, in some cases, trafficking.

There is little credible evidence that this approach to raising awareness is effective in achieving these results. Given the lack of evidence in this area, it would be of particular value that the technical support provided in strategic communications be coupled with a strong emphasis on building an evidence base by ensuring that communication activities are accompanied with evaluative research designed to assess the effectiveness of the campaigns and the results of any changes in attitudes or behaviour.

Finally, the programme will also be supported by a monitoring and evaluation component identified as a ‘real-time M&E mechanism’ used to ‘capture the progress of its medium-term response, to review the risk and gap analysis and to enable prompt accountability for delivery’.[[39]](#footnote-39) As stated above, the need for the programme to be oriented around learning cannot be overstated, given the significant lack of evidence for effective programming for reducing human trafficking. A key aspect of a real-time monitoring mechanism is this function – to undertake evaluate monitoring to assess the effectiveness of the outputs described above in reaching their desired outcomes.

## Results

Based on these programmatic inputs, the following **outputs** are noted to initiate the results portion of the programme’s theory of change[[40]](#footnote-40):

1. Return and reintegration support provided to victims of trafficking
2. Law enforcement capabilities strengthened to investigate trafficking suspects
3. Judicial capabilities strengthened to prosecute trafficking suspects
4. Strategic communication tools and mechanisms supported

From these outputs, an **intermediate outcome** level is suggested for areas of support that are more indirect and less likely to directly aid beneficiaries. This level can be characterised as the programme’s main counterpart or stakeholder adopting or taking up key aspects of programme support towards their own implementation of that support, which then leads to the programme’s desired outcomes and impact.

The intermediate outcomes *assume* that the programme’s support is relevant to specific needs and context in which it is provided, that there is traction amongst the programme’s counterparts for the specific support that the programme provides, and that the counterparts will have the adequate capacity and organisational structures or capabilities to effectively adopt and implement the programme’s support.

The following **outcomes** are suggested as resulting from the programme’s outputs and their adoption:

1. Victims of trafficking reintegrated into Nigerian society
2. Enhanced state capacity to investigate and prosecute trafficking suspects
3. Enhanced public awareness of human trafficking reduces complicity
4. Increased deterrence from trafficking in persons

These outcomes *assume* the following:

* Effective reintegration support reduces recidivism rates amongst victims of trafficking;
* Victims willingly engage in supporting investigations with testimony;
* NAPTIP support will translate into organisation-level capacity resilient to staff turnover;
* Judicial support increases judicial institutional capacity beyond specific individuals to ensure more effective suspect prosecution;
* Reduced trafficking prosecution time will result in increased numbers of trafficking prosecutions;
* Strategic communication support enhances organisational capacity to undertake effective strategic communication and awareness campaigns;
* Increased awareness of the negative aspects of human trafficking will catalyse behaviour change to dis-incentivise trafficking.

Ultimately, the programme’s intended objective is articulated in its **impact**, suggested as the following:

* The prevalence of human trafficking from Nigeria is reduced.

Figure 1: Modern Slavery Unit Nigeria programme theory of change graphic



# **Results Framework**

While the section above seeks to articulate the programme’s theory of change, which essentially describes the change that it intends to achieve and the manner that it seeks to do so, the results framework provides a set of indicators to help monitor, at a more granular or project-specific level, progress towards achieving the programme’s desired results. An indicative articulation of the results framework is provided below, with a more finalised and operational version to follow.

Table 1: Modern Slavery Unit Nigeria programme results framework

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Level & Statement** | **Indicator** | **Definition** | **Data source** |
| **Impact** |  |  |  |
| The prevalence of human trafficking from Nigeria is reduced | The number of potential victims of trafficking identified in the UK who originate from Nigeria | Reported on an annual basis by the National Referral Mechanism, identifying the nationality of potential victims of trafficking as Nigerian | National Referral Mechanism Annual Report |
| Total number of identified victims of human trafficking from Nigeria | Migrants identified as potential victims of human trafficking that identify their citizenship as Nigerian | Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative (CTDC) – Global Dataset |
| The number of rescued victims of human trafficking from Nigeria | Number of individuals identified as being ‘rescued victims of human trafficking’ by NAPTIP | NAPTIP |
| **Outcome** |  |  |  |
| Victims of trafficking reintegrated into Nigerian society | VoTs express successful reintegration into their desired community and espouse no ambition of irregular emigration | Successful reintegration assesses economic, social, and psychological aspects of reintegration support as achieving its objective of ensuring victims are integrated and supported within their community | Victim perception survey |
| Enhanced state capacity to investigate and prosecute trafficking suspects | Enhanced conviction success of investigated and prosecuted HT cases | Number of successfully prosecuted HT cases (measured as a conviction) as a proportion of the total cases investigated | NAPTIP (investigations) + judiciary court data (convictions) |
| Enhanced public awareness reduces complicity in and increases deterrence from human trafficking | Behavioural change that discourages human trafficking and lowers likelihood of individuals putting themselves at risk as a result of increased public awareness of the dangers of human trafficking | Proportion of individuals exposed to programme-supported strategic communication mechanisms and tools that report change in attitudes towards the costs / benefits of trafficking | Public perceptions survey |
| **Intermediate Outcome** |  |  |  |
| *Counterparts adopt and implement programme-supported outputs* | Victims utilise provided support | VoTs make use of support as intended to be done or undertaken, measured as proportion of total victims that receive support package | Victim support survey |
| Enhanced organisational capacity for HT investigations | Senior managers within NAPTIP able to identify organisational-level improvements in capacity to undertake HT investigations as a result of programme support | NAPTIP investigation support survey |
| Judges adopt and implement enhanced capacity and increase number of HT case prosecutions | Number of HT cases prosecuted in total by the targeted judges per year | Judicial support survey |
| Strategic communication tools and mechanisms adopted | Proportion of programme-supported tools and mechanisms adopted’, where ‘adoption’ is understood to be the take-up or incorporation of programme supported tools into organisational approaches, structures or processes that support more effective strategic communication practices. | NAPTIP strat comms survey |
| Target populations exposed to programme-supported public awareness campaigns | Total number of people within targeted population groups reached by awareness campaigns | NAPTIP strat comms survey |
| **Outputs** |  |  |  |
| Return and reintegration support provided to victims of trafficking. | Victim support packages provided to VoTs | The total number of victims of trafficking that receive (initiate) and participate in the full scope of programme-supported reintegration packages, including basic assistance in their return, and support for rehabilitation and reintegration into Nigerian society | Project records (implementation partner) |
| VoTs complete programme-supported reintegration package | The total number of victims of trafficking that complete the full process and scope of programme-supported reintegration packages | Project records (implementation partner) |
| Law enforcement capabilities strengthened to investigate trafficking suspects | People trained | The total number of full-time NAPTIP staff that receive programme-supported training or capacity building to enhance HT investigation capabilities | Project records (capacity building records) |
| Useful training | ‘Useful training’ assesses individuals’ own perceptions of the relevance and degree of potential application and use of the training material within their organisational affiliations | Self-evaluation tool |
| Investigation system and mechanism enhancements developed | ‘Investigation system and mechanism enhancements’ include changes to NAPTIP’s organisational processes or tools used to investigate human trafficking cases provided by programme support | Project records (technical assistance reports) |
| Judicial capabilities strengthened to prosecute trafficking suspects | Judges trained | ‘Judges trained’ counts the total number of identified judges specifically mandated to prosecute HT cases and therefore targeted for programme support, who participate in capacity-building activities on various legal aspects of HT prosecution & victim sensitivity. | Project records (capacity building records) |
| Useful training | ‘Useful training’ assesses individuals’ own perceptions of the relevance and degree of potential application and use of the training material within their organisational affiliations | Self-evaluation tool |
| Judicial mechanisms developed to enhanced prosecution effectiveness | ‘Judicial mechanisms’ include procedures, planning processes, or other systems within the judicial process designed to enhance the effectiveness that judges have in prosecuting human traffickers | Project records (technical assistance records) |
| Judicial infrastructure supported | ‘Judicial infrastructure’ includes courtrooms related to the identified judges mandated to prosecute HT cases, where programme-supported equipment has been provided to enhance prosecute through allowing remote testimonies, digital recordings, and other similar procedural enhancements | Project records |
| Strategic communication tools and mechanisms supported | People trained | The total number of full-time NAPTIP staff that receive programme-supported training or capacity building to enhance communication capabilities | Project records (capacity building records) |
| Useful training | ‘Useful training’ assesses individuals’ own perceptions of the relevance and degree of potential application and use of the training material within their organisational affiliations | Self-evaluation tool |
| Strategic communication mechanisms and tools developed | ‘Strategic communication mechanisms and tools’ include changes to communication campaigns, strategies and processes, or specific approaches and methods used by NAPTIP to raise awareness about the dangers of human trafficking | Project records (technical assistance reports) |

# **References**

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Stabilisation Unit, ‘Monitoring and Evaluation Adviser: Modern Slavery Unit – Terms of Reference’, 2017

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Yea, S, ‘Editorial: the politics of evidence, data and research in anti-trafficking work’, *Anti-Trafficking Review*, issue 8, 2017, p1-13

# **Annex I: Nigeria mission delegation & discussions**

Table 2: List of Nigeria mission delegation members & discussions

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Nigeria mission – UK delegation | |
| **Name** | **Affiliation** |
| Lewis Evans | First Secretary, Justice and Home Affairs, British High Commission, Abuja |
| Joe Shapiro | Deputy Head – International Programmes, Modern Slavery Unit, London |
| Jesse McConnell | Deployable Civilian Expert, Stabilisation Unit, London |
| Richard Sandall | Private Sector Adviser, DFID, Lagos |
| Ursula Antwi-Boasiako | Modern Slavery Team, DFID, London |
| Kelly Stiebel | Livelihoods Adviser, DFID, Abuja |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Nigeria mission – discussions | | |
| **Date** | **Organisation met** | **Location** |
| 13 November | DFID-Nigeria | British High Commission, Abuja |
|  | Immigration Enforcement International | British High Commission, Abuja |
|  | NAPTIP (national office) | NAPTIP, Abuja |
|  | International Organisation for Migration | IOM, Abuja |
| 14 November | Edo State Human Trafficking Task Force | Edo State Government, Benin City |
|  | NAPTIP – Zonal Command | NAPTIP, Benin City |
|  | NAPTIP shelter | NAPTIP shelter, Benin City |
|  | IDIA Renaissance (NGO) | Protea Hotel, Benin City |
| 15 November | Joint Border Task Force | JBTF, Benin City |
|  | International Organisation for Migration | IOM, Lagos |
| 16 November | JBTF Criminal Justice Adviser | British Deputy High Commission, Lagos |
|  | Mirabel (NGO) | Community hospital, Lagos |
|  | NAPTIP – Zonal Command | NAPTIP, Lagos |
|  | NAPTIP shelter | NAPTIP shelter, Lagos |
|  | International Organisation for Migration *(IOM flight observation)* | Murtala Mohammed Airport, Lagos |

# **Annex II: Programme ‘spheres of influence’**

Figure 2: Programme spheres of influence



1. Stabilisation Unit, ‘Modern Slavery Fund Nigeria Scoping Task: Programme Scoping Report – recommended approach and options for delivery on a multi-year programme’, 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Stabilisation Unit, ‘Monitoring and Evaluation Adviser: Modern Slavery Unit – Terms of Reference’, 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. For example, see Stern *et al*, ‘Broadening the Range of Designs and Methods for Impact Evaluations: report of a study commissioned by the Department for International Development’, DFID Working Paper 38, 2012, and N Stame, ‘Theory-based Evaluation and Types of Complexity’, *Evaluation*, 2004 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. ‘Contribution analysis’ provides a methodological example of a set of tools for evaluating how a programme or portfolio may contribute to a specific change. See, for example, J Mayne, ‘Addressing Attribution through Contribution Analysis: using performance measures sensible’, *The Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation,* Vol 16 No 1, 2001, J Mayne, ‘Contribution analysis: coming of age?’, *Evaluation*, 18(3), 2012, and H White & D Phillips, ‘Addressing attribution of cause and effect in small n impact evaluations: towards an integrated framework’, 3IE Working Paper 15, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. DFID (2013), ’How to note: Evaluating Influence’, *A DFID practice paper*, p13 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. See Annex II for a graphic representation of this approach to defining a programme’s *spheres of influence*. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. <https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/index/> [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. SU, Terms of Reference [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. National Crime Agency, ‘National Referral Mechanism Statistics – End of Year Summary 2016’, September 2017, URL: <http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/national-referral-mechanism-statistics/2016-nrm-statistics/788-national-referral-mechanism-statistics-end-of-year-summary-2016/file> [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. SU, Modern Slavery Fund Scoping Report, p4. However, this statement is partially anecdotal and does not provide specific quantification of the ‘increasing number of cases’, nor identify clear sources of where the evidence for this originates. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. SU, Modern Slavery Fund Scoping Report, p4 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. While the Home Office programming on human trafficking does not include the scope to undertake efforts to address poverty directly, indications from DFID suggest strongly complementarity in programming, in which DFID seeks to address some of the wider issues around livelihoods and state / non-state response capacities, with a strong concentration in Edo State, where trafficking is most prevalent. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. European Asylum Support Office, ‘Country of Origin Information Report: Nigeria Sex trafficking of women’, October 2015, p17-18 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Jorgen Carling, ‘Migration, Human Smuggling and Trafficking from Nigeria to Europe’, International Organisation for Migration: migration research series, 2006, p21-22 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. European Asylum Support Office, ‘Country of Origin Information Report: Nigeria Sex trafficking of women’, October 2015, p22-25 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. SU, Modern Slavery Fund Scoping Report, p4-5 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Jorgen Carling, ‘Migration, Human Smuggling and Trafficking from Nigeria to Europe’, International Organisation for Migration: migration research series, 2006, p30-31 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, ‘A Strategic Programme to Combat Modern Slavery from Edo State, Nigeria: Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner’s Recommendations’, p11 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Ibid, p11 [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. SU, Modern Slavery Fund Scoping Report, p7 [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. In ‘A Strategic Programme to Combat Modern Slavery from Edo State, Nigeria: Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner’s Recommendations’, p19 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. SU, Modern Slavery Fund Scoping Report, p8 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. SU, Modern Slavery Fund Scoping Report, p8 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. See S Yea, ‘Editorial: the politics of evidence, data and research in anti-trafficking work’, *Anti-Trafficking Review*, for more on the challenges of obtaining meaningful data about important aspects of human trafficking [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. See Idris, I (2017) ‘Interventions to combat modern slavery’, K4D Helpdesk Report 225 (available at: <http://www.gsdrc.org/publications/interventions-to-combat-modern-slavery/>), which underscores how little evidence there is of effective programming in this area [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Modern Slavery Fund, ‘Tackling Modern Slavery in Nigeria: Victim Support Package – Terms of Reference’ [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. MSF, Victim Support ToR [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. This was noted in discussions during the field mission with IOM and NAPTIP at both national and zonal levels. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. The mission met with the Task Force in Edo State, 14 November 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Modern Slavery Fund, ‘Tacking Modern Slavery in Nigeria: Law Enforcement Capacity Building – Terms of Reference’ [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. MSF, Law Enforcement ToR [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Discussion with Immigration Enforcement International, British High Commission, Abuja, 13 November 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Capacity Building for NAPTIP’s Implementation of the Action Plan against Human trafficking’, October 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Modern Slavery Fund, ‘Tackling Modern Slavery in Nigeria: Judicial Capacity-Building – Terms of Reference’ [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. MSF, Judicial ToR [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Discussion with the High Commission’s judicial reform advisor, Lagos, 16 November 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Stabilisation Unit, ‘Strategic Communications Adviser – Terms of Reference’ [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. This support would likely be provided through NAPTIP’s department of Public Enlightenment, identified during the mission’s discussion with NAPTIP’s national office in Abuja, 13 November 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. SU, Modern Slavery Fund Scoping Report, p16 [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. The outputs listed here are considered output ‘areas’ that aim to broadly capture each of the input areas of the programme. The results framework details specific indicators that provide more granular view on monitoring progress of the various activities within each of the output areas. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)